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Escaping The Tragedy of The Commons1 
Roger A. Lohmann 
West Virginia University 
The major conceptual departure for the modern theory of the commons 
was Garrett Hardin’s powerful metaphor of the “tragedy of the commons.” In 
the metaphor of the communally shared space of a medieval English 
commons denuded when livestock owners supposedly could establish no 
effective controls to prevented over-grazing, Hardin’s provocative metaphor 
appeared to sum up the limitations of all efforts at voluntary cooperation and 
collaboration. If Hardin was correct (which, it turned out he wasn’t as 
Lohmann (1989 and 1992) argued and Elinor Ostrom (1990 convincingly 
demonstrated) then the entire enterprise of “rational choice” social, political 
and economic theory points to free-riding as a genuinely tragic outcome of 
ventures in cooperation, sharing and joint purpose as Mancur Olson (1965) 
had claimed. Fortunately, it is not so, but if it were, true believers in 
voluntary action, volunteerism, donation, and philanthropy would be justly 
condemned as naive and misguided if they fail to recognize this limitation. 
If, on the other hand, Hardin’s powerful metaphor were empirically 
misleading or incomplete – which it has since been shown to be by Ostrom 
and her colleagues’ and doctoral students’ gathering of an increasingly large 
body of historical and cross-cultural evidence – then the problem is not in the 
behavior of participants in nonprofit organization, voluntary action and 
philanthropy, but in the theory. In point of fact, not only are the tragedy of 
the commons, and the associated problem known as “free riding” avoidable, 
they pose dynamic and powerful alternatives to Hardin’s dualism – which 
was also evident in Paul Samuelson’s economics: public or private; market or 
state. 
Table 1 – Ostroms’ Four Types of Goods 
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Ostrom and Hess (2007; adapted from Ostrom & Ostrom, 1977). 
 
1 An earlier version of this statement was published in a 1995 newsletter of the National Society of 
Fund Raising Executives (NSFRE).  
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Thus, the metaphor of the commons (absent the necessary tragedy) 
suggests itself as a suitable metaphor on which to elaborate the major 
theoretical issues of nonprofit studies. It is increasingly clear that the 
commons metaphor is a very powerful one; It has turned out to be the 
departure point for an entirely new body of theorizing about collective action 
with implications for history, law, political and economic theory, social 
behavior and social practice in many fields and communities. 
Choosing to confront the central theoretical issues of nonprofit studies 
within a commons theory frame, rather than on the more familiar grounds of 
“public goods”, “open systems”, “social exchange” or some other more familiar 
metaphor must seem a dubious choice to psychologists, sociologists, social 
workers and other researchers and practitioners. At least one law school 
colleague has inquired why I made such a choice and a social work colleague 
has criticized me in print for failing to incorporate the familiar terms of 
conflict theory into my approach (Brilliant, 1995). Both fair critiques, but 
currently, commons theorizing is less than three decades old.  
Like it or not, the traditional institutional infrastructure of nonprofit law, 
tax exemptions, service contracting and other practical features of the 
nonprofit world have been spelled out in terms of rational choice theory, 
largely by lawyers, economists and political scientists (roughly in that order). 
Efforts to address significant practical and policy questions still largely occur 
within that theoretical lens. Failure to recognize this merely increases one’s 
(already slight) chances of impacting policy and practice in that arena. 
One reductionism which was immediately obvious to me was the 
assumption that the philosophical premise that humans are simply and 
merely self-interested and, therefore, profit-oriented (with which I disagree 
for reasons stated throughout my work). In fact one way to view commons 
theory is an effort to state the circumstances under which cooperation is 
motivated by conditions other than shared profits. Another reductionism 
which was not obvious to me at the beginning, but which has emerged in the 
wake of several reviews is the view that human relations are inherently 
conflictual and therefore real cooperation is only possible under certain 
circumstances, if at all.  
 Reductionism #1. The more substantive concerns which animated that 
presentation amounted to a direct, frontal assault on the futility of nonprofit 
research which insists upon limiting its investigations only to the most 
market-like nonprofits. 
My lens on nonprofit organization and voluntary action is somewhat 
different than that of the majority of my research and theoretical colleagues. 
This is so for a variety of reasons. First of all, unlike most whose experience 
is limited to a single community or region, I have had an opportunity to 
witness at least limited local community commons, and important 
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differences, in four distinct regions of the U.S.: the Midwest, New England, 
the mid-South and Appalachia. More importantly perhaps, theoretically 
speaking, I have chosen to focus on the sphere of activity known as voluntary 
action, rather than the more customary and increasingly well-trod terrain of 
nonprofit organization.  
Reductionism #2. The conclusion of a recent reviewer that “conflict is 
missing from” the theory of the commons is an ill-considered conclusion on at 
least two grounds: 1) Latent conflict perspectives (e.g., between donors, 
between donors and staff, among staff, between any of these and 
beneficiaries, etc.) can be “teased out” and developed at any point without 
damage to the overall theoretical structure. However, commons are not 
originally, constitutionally or structurally intended as vehicles for conflict; 
although some – organized deliberation and dialogue being primary examples 
– are clearly organized for purposes of conflict resolution. 2) The more 
important point, however, seems to be that any assumption of inevitable and 
universal conflict is a departure from the constitution and social contract of 
most commons – which are about cooperation as a regulatory agent in 
voluntary action. 
 The notion that conflict should be a central premise of what is, in essence, a 
theory of organized and collective cooperation would be as misguided and 
foolish a piece of disciplinary reductionism as the view that if all behavior is self-
interested and profit-oriented that therefore greed in commons is good.  
The issue is not whether or not self-interest or conflict exists in the real world, 
nor whether conflict or self-interest exists in the commons. What is really at stake 
here is the willingness of economic and political theorists to give up (or at least 
modify in a more realistic direction) the Hobbesian view of human life as 
exclusively “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short”. Even more misguided is the 
illusion on the far right that we need to make it so.  
A plausible case can be (and has been) made, for example, that while Adam 
Smith in The Wealth of Nations appeared to be the source of current views in the 
centrality of self-interest, he just as clearly rejected narrow self interest and 
articulated quite another position in his other classic work, The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments, especially in the second (1790) edition. Credit the economist Robert 
Garnett for bringing this alternative view more clearly into focus. (Garnett, 2015; 
Garnett, 2019) 
What may be confusing these folks is that the commons offers a strictly 
inward-focused view of voluntary association and assembly. However present 
interpersonal conflict may be, it is not the overriding purpose. It is, from a 
systematic perspective, an unintended consequence. I have never known a 
group, association, union, religious faction (except, perhaps, an athletic “fight 
club” or a debating society, where members cooperate for conflict), to organize 
for the stated purpose of fighting with one another. 
Conflict does exist within commons, but primarily as a breakdown of comity. 
Conflict also exists between commons; in which case defeating the common 
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enemy becomes one of the shared purposes. Conflict between commons, or 
between commons and other social institutions, is another matter entirely.  
The Dark Side 
Another criticism of commons theory is that it is too optimistic, sunny and 
insufficiently attentive to “the dark side(s)” of human behavior: not only 
conflict, but also association to promote social disorganization, criminality 
and anti-social behavior, even evil. The sad reality is that the means of 
voluntary action work equally well for dark-side purposes as for pursuit of 
prosocial goods. This issue is properly engaged at the level of assumptions. If 
you adopt the universal priority of the self-interest assumption, you get one 
set of results, if you substitute the affluence assumption you get another. In 
essence, the issue can be stated thus: In my expressions of commons theory, I 
was primarily interested in organized cooperation for the achievement of a 
set of collective “goods”. This does not mean that I believe that “bads” do not 
exist, or that people do not organize for bads. 
This is different from the externalities issue in economics, where “bads” 
are produced incidentally as byproducts of goods production. And it is 
something worthy of further exploration.  
Bargain-Basement Affluence 
Some readers have misunderstood the intent of the affluence assumption in 
the commons theory of voluntary action. Nowhere in the book (Lohmann, 1992) 
or elsewhere do I ever suggest that I am intending affluence to mean anything 
like an income in the upper 25% (or any other bigger or smaller percentage) of 
the income distribution, although this is how it has been interpreted. Conversely, 
I state explicitly (Lohmann, 1992, p. 48-49 ) that: “Bona fide participation in the 
commons is available only to the affluent: those people whose individual and group 
survival and reproduction are sufficiently assured so that their own self-interest is not 
their paramount concern.” (emphasis added)  
At least one critic has taken this to mean that I intend the theory only for the 
voluntary action of patronage or philanthropy by the idle rich. My original intent 
was actually quite the opposite. I meant to suggest here that a principal lower 
limit on voluntary participation is Self-help groups among homeless and 
unemployed chronically mentally ill persons (who are, in conventional socio-
economic terms simultaneously unproductive and nonaffluent) are nonetheless 
affluent -- in my sense -- in their available time) 
Incidentally, as this statement illustrates, I purposely adopted the somewhat 
stilted language and present-perfect tense of classical theory. (“Bona fide 
participation... is available only to the affluent....”) 
A Third Type of Goods  
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One of the most resistant notions in current utilitarian and rational choice 
theory is the view that all human goods are readily dichotomized into private 
and public. Theoretically, this dichotomy stems directly from the tendency to 
pose “individual” and “society” (or singularities and pluralities) as polar 
opposites. In this view, it appears commonsensical that goods pursued by 
“individuals” are “private goods” and those pursued by society are “collective”, 
“social” or “public” goods. Such dichotomies are entirely consistent with the 
overall tone of rational choice theory (which also tends toward grandstand views 
of “objective reality” from the viewpoint of an objective observer looking in, 
parallelism of knowledge and reality, and other markers of an outdated 
positivism.) 
The dualism of public and private goods is directly related to the seemingly 
ineluctable conclusion that if a good is not public, then it must therefore be 
private. Generally, this approach has been antithetical to many “nonprofit” 
interests in the arts, human services, health care and other fields, as well as 
resulting in a kind of “capture the flag” approach to many public issues. This 
results in a kind of high-stakes roulette: If a group is able to successfully capture 
the mechanisms of the state, its goods are proclaimed “public” and universal; if 
not, they are purely private and individual. 
It escapes the notice of dualists that this is one of the primary contributors to 
the problematic quality of the term “public” in our lives. The rather modest 
suggestion of the theory of the commons is that the “special case” which goes by 
various titles in rational choice theory (limited public goods, etc.) is actually a 
completely separate category. Rather than applying the usual neologisms, it 
seemed appropriate under the circumstances to extend the metaphor of the 
commons and label these desirables “common goods”.  
Actually commons theory resolved this question several decades ago. Such 
common goods are those pursued jointly by pluralities less than the dominant 
majority controlling the state and its unique ability to define public goods.  In an 
era when the state has proven relatively powerless to define unambiguous public 
goods and public policy making is largely circumscribed in terms of a 
competition among interest groups, the state itself has become a major producer 
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